










Manuscript version: Published Version 
The version presented in WRAP is the published version (Version of Record). 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/133295                            
 
How to cite: 
The repository item page linked to above, will contain details on accessing citation guidance 
from the publisher. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 




The “common sense” conundrums of prosecuting violence 
against women
Vanessa E Munro*
The jury plays a pivotal role within many criminal justice 
systems. It has often been lauded for its unique ability to ensure 
the involvement of, and accountability to, members of the public 
in the application of criminal laws to citizens. At the same time, 
however, what goes on in the jury room has remained remarkably 
opaque. We know little about the nature and content of jury 
deliberations, about how legal tests are understood and applied 
therein, and about what persuasive strategies are most effective 
in securing a verdict. Over the past two decades, I — together 
with colleagues — have conducted several studies, using trial 
simulations, designed to explore jurors’ approach to decision-
making in rape cases. In this article, I reflect on the key findings 
from that work and situate them in the context of ongoing 
international dialogue about both how to respond to the “justice 
gap” in rape cases, and what to do about juries. 
I INTRODUCTION
I want to begin by expressing my sincere thanks to the members of the Women 
in Law Committee for inviting me to give this talk, to the New Zealand Law 
Foundation and Borrin Foundation for funding my travel to be here, and to 
Professor Elisabeth McDonald for including me in some fascinating discussions 
during my visit about the future of sexual offences trials in New Zealand. I am 
hugely honoured to be giving this year’s Shirley Smith Address. It is a particular 
treat to do so in the prestigious surrounds of this Parliament Building and in 
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the company of what I know to be allies and fellow travellers on the journey 
that Shirley herself trail-blazed towards achieving social justice — both in and 
through the law. I am grateful to every one of you for making the time to come 
to the talk tonight and I hope that I will be able to do enough for you to feel 
that investment of time and attention has been duly rewarded.
In a context in which Lord Devlin, at the outset of his 1956 Hamlyn 
Lectures, observed that the jury trial was a subject on which it was not possible 
to “say anything very novel or very profound”,1 I may well have set myself a 
rather uphill struggle on this occasion. But as many feminists before me have 
said in respect of far bigger challenges, nevertheless I shall persist.
In this lecture, I want to reflect on the precarious nature of our 
contemporary affections towards the jury, focusing particularly — but not 
exclusively — on its role within sexual offence trials. Drawing on findings 
across a number of experimental studies that I have conducted with colleagues 
over the last 15 years, I want to consider the thorny question of whether — in a 
world in which legal norms and institutions, as well as social interactions, still 
bear the hallmarks of patriarchal privilege — we can be confident that justice is 
being done behind the closed doors of the jury room; and if we cannot, where 
does that leave us in terms of social and legal reforms? 
In approaching that question, I will inevitably draw primarily from my 
own experience of juries and their operation across United Kingdom criminal 
justice systems. There, as elsewhere, we have engaged in long-standing and 
still-very-much-live debates about the extent to which, within the broader 
parameters of an adversarial system, it is possible to reform the procedural 
and evidential norms of the rape trial in order to respond adequately to the 
vulnerability of complainants and ensure they are not re-traumatised by the 
process of holding their attackers legally accountable. 
There have also, in past decades, been several legislative and practical 
* Vanessa Munro is a Professor of Law at Warwick Law School in the United Kingdom. This text 
(minus subsequently added footnoting) was delivered as the Shirley Smith Address, at Parliament 
House, Wellington, on 27 August 2019. I am hugely grateful to Shirley Smith’s family and to the 
Wellington Branch of the Women in Law Committee for the invitation to give this address, to the 
Borrin Foundation and New Zealand Law Foundation for funding my participation (as part of a wider 
programme of activities in which I was kindly invited to participate by Professor Elisabeth McDonald, 
to whom I am also much indebted), and to all those who took time to attend the lecture. I am also 
grateful to Jan Logie, MP and Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Justice, for sponsoring the hosting at 
Parliament, and for her generous introduction.
1 Patrick Devlin Trial by Jury (Steven & Sons, London, 1956) at 3. 
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innovations that ought to have improved the position — including: formal 
restrictions on the use of certain sexual history and character evidence; special 
measures to allow complainants to give testimony behind a screen, remotely 
or via a pre-recorded police statement (and, more recently, pre-recorded 
cross-examination); provision of detailed training to judges and advocates on 
reactions to trauma amongst victims of sexual violence; and the introduction 
of judicial directions designed to challenge certain “rape myths”, for example, 
in respect of the likelihood of resistance or the significance of a delayed report. 
But despite this, the rate of attrition of rape cases through the criminal justice 
process in all jurisdictions of the United Kingdom remains a source of serious 
concern and the evidence suggests that complainants have experienced little 
improvement in the process.2 
I know, of course, that these are also very live issues in the New Zealand 
context — that here too there is a sense of frustration that reforms to date 
have too often been piecemeal and not always lived up to their transformative 
potential, even when crafted with good intentions.3 In neither hemisphere 
should that, in my view, cause us to abandon legislative and evidential reform 
initiatives, but this dawning sense of their limitations has, I think, rightly 
provoked a turn of attention to other aspects of the justice process that also pose 
obstacles. As part of that shift, the jury, which had for some considerable time 
been relatively, and — as I will discuss in a moment — somewhat remarkably, 
insulated from critique, has attracted increased attention.
Though the Law Commissions in the United Kingdom have not gone so far 
as their New Zealand counterpart in floating the removal of the jury from sexual 
2 Indeed, recent statistics suggest the justice gap in rape cases may be widening rather than retracting. 
The Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales recently disclosed that attrition at all stages 
of the process had increased, with approximately 3.3 per cent of reported rape complaints resulting 
in a conviction: Crown Prosecution Service Violence Against Women and Girls Report 2018–19 (2019). 
In England and Wales, and in Scotland, formal reviews of procedures for, and outcomes of, rape 
complaints are again underway, reflecting the sense of lack of adequate progress following prior 
reforms. 
3 This is evidenced, for example, by New Zealand Law Commission The Justice Response to Victims of 
Sexual Violence: Criminal Trials and Alternative Processes (NZLC R136, 2015). While the results of the 
specialist Sexual Violence Pilot Court are promising (see Sue Allison and Tania Boyer Evaluation of the 
Sexual Violence Pilot Court (Gravitas Research and Strategy, June 2019), particularly when combined 
with intended additional reforms to the process of giving testimony announced by the Government 
earlier this year, research currently being conducted by Elisabeth McDonald and others, which draws 
on trial audio recording and transcripts, and which has formed the basis of stakeholder workshops in 
Wellington and Auckland in August 2019, continues to raise further concerns. 
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offence cases,4 there has certainly been animated debate in recent years over the 
extent to which jurors can and should be trusted in this context; and of what 
additional steps might need to be taken to increase confidence in this respect. 
Current suggestions include, for example, compulsory pre-trial education for 
jurors, most likely in the form of a DVD. This would be designed to disavow 
jurors of common but often unfounded and damaging expectations regarding 
“normal” responses before, during and after a sexual assault.5 There have also 
been calls for an intervention to screen jurors on the basis of their levels of “rape 
myth acceptance”, as evidenced by responses to attitudinal questionnaires.6
These proposals reflect, I suggest, a broader trajectory of what might be 
termed “falling out of love” with the institution of the jury; and I want to say 
a little more about that shifting and increasingly precarious relationship before 
turning to my own findings on how jurors in our mock rape trials approached 
their task. Those findings will in turn, I hope, help us to consider the merits 
and demerits of intervening in the jury, including through pre-trial screening 
and education, for example, and to reflect more broadly on the jury’s future in 
the criminal process.
II FALLING IN — AND OUT OF — LOVE WITH THE JURY
The liberal state and its legal system’s relationship with the institution of “the 
jury trial” has certainly had its twists and turns. For prolonged periods of its 
history, though, it has been marked by a romanticisation of the jury, as much 
for what it symbolises and enigmatically refuses to reveal, as for its actual role 
in administering justice or its effectiveness in doing so. 
In 1956, Lord Devlin might have purported to have nothing novel or 
profound to say about the jury, but he certainly had things to say about it 
that were poetic. It is, he said, “the lamp that shows that freedom lives”.7 In 
4 Law Commission, above n 3, at [6.34]–[6.49]. 
5 See, for example, the work of JURIES, a group campaigning for the mandatory briefings in myths and 
stereotypes about sexual violence for juries in rape, sexual assault and abuse trials. See more at JURIES 
“JURIES Campaign Brief ” (5 November 2014) <www.juriesunderstandingsv.wordpress.com>; and 
Olivia Smith and Tina Skinner “How Rape Myths are Used and Challenged in Rape and Sexual 
Assault Trials” (2017) 26(4) S & LS 441.
6 Dominic Willmott “An Examination of the Relationship between Juror Attitudes, Psychological 
Constructs, and Verdict Decisions within Rape Trials” (Psychology PhD, University of Huddersfield, 
2018). 
7 Devlin, above n 1, at 164. 
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other words, its existence reflects a core commitment to public participation 
in the justice process. It provides an avenue for accountability to the citizenry 
not only for the substance of the state’s laws, but for the way in which that 
substance is interpreted and applied. As such, when that light cast by the jury 
is threatened, the citizenry should be alarmed, for it is then, according to Lord 
Devlin, there is no restraint left to hem in executive power. 
The contemporary rejoinder to this, of course, is that, while that may 
have been true in an era where executive power lay with a singular monarch 
or undemocratic ruling elite, it no longer applies. Contemporary participatory 
and representative political systems, coupled with the establishment of an 
independent judiciary, entail that the jury is not now required to act as a 
stalwart force against totalitarian power. Its lamp, in other words, can safely 
be snuffed out. 
Yet, as Lady Justice Hallett observed, in a Blackstone Lecture given 50 
years after Lord Devlin’s, also on the topic of juries:8 while it might be right to 
identify a reduction in the jury’s role as a crucial guardian of liberty, it remains 
important for its enhancement of civil participation in the administration of 
justice, and for ensuring a more inclusive and diverse engagement with law 
than could ever be achieved whilst judicial and legislative personnel remain so 
often drawn from privileged social groups (as they surely do, unfortunately, in 
many legal jurisdictions). 
Juries, Lady Justice Hallett explained:9: 
… provide another form of accountability. They ensure that in each criminal 
trial it is not just the accused that are on trial. They ensure that the criminal 
process is itself on trial. 
A jury may refuse to convict in spite of the law and the evidence because it 
concludes that the law is an unjust law. The jury passes its verdict on the law.
That may well be true; and yet it begs as many questions as it answers about 
the value and legitimacy of the jury. Clearly, there have been cases in which 
such resistance from the jury has provoked progressive change. Lady Justice 
Hallett refers, for example, to those involving the historical prosecution of 
doctors who hastened the death of patients in the process of administering 
8 Lady Hallett “Trial by Jury — Past and Present” (Blackstone Lecture, Pembroke College, Oxford, 20 
May 2017).
9 At 9. 
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pain relief, where the jury’s refusal to convict notwithstanding a cast iron legal 
basis prompted the development of the doctrine of “double-effect” to rectify 
an injustice in the letter of the law.10 But there are other situations — and 
sexual offence cases may well be prime amongst them — where jurors’ refusal 
to convict in spite of the law and the evidence, and in particular because of a 
discomfort at the consequences of any such conviction for the accused, takes 
on a rather different, and I would argue often significantly less progressive, 
hue. 
To properly understand and evaluate this aspect of a jury’s functioning 
requires a stripping away of the romanticised notions in which it has 
historically been cloaked as a defender of civil freedom, and a candid appraisal 
of the contemporary role that it does and should play in dispensing justice. But 
the secrecy that continues to surround jury deliberations makes this difficult. 
Intrigue over what goes on behind the closed doors of the jury room, and the 
drama that we presume fills this space as competing perspectives are presented, 
challenged, and reconciled, may make excellent fodder for Hollywood scripts. 
But it leaves a substantial gap in our understanding of the operation of justice; 
a gap that I believe is increasingly hard to reconcile with claims made on behalf 
of the modern jury to civic responsibility and inclusion. 
Lord Devlin himself acknowledged that the jury, in bringing together 
12 random strangers with no necessary experience of critical thinking, asking 
them to listen to and process swathes of information, and then expecting them 
in a short period of time to form a shared consensus on a verdict regarding 
the fate of the accused, embodies “a ridiculous and impracticable idea”.11 But, 
nonetheless, he maintained these bizarre and enigmatic qualities were part of 
its delicate eco-system, and to dig under the surface, or impose restraint or 
rationality, on the jury would be ill-advised. As he put it:12
Since no one really knows how the jury works or indeed can satisfactorily 
explain to a theorist why it works at all, it is wise not to tamper with it until 
the need for alteration is shown to be overwhelming.
But, it is easy to presume that a process which is veiled from scrutiny “works”, 
and Lord Devlin’s approach, still effectively supported through our respect for 
10 At 9, citing in particular the case of Dr Arthur: see “R v Arthur” (1981) 283 BMJ 1340.
11 Devlin, above n 1, at 4. 
12 At 57 (emphasis added). 
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the sanctity of the jury room, has a distinctly self-fulfilling logic. 
There are, of course, legitimate reasons to be concerned about tampering 
with an established system, and maintaining public confidence in the justice 
process is important,13 but having a deliberative “black hole” at the heart of 
our criminal justice system is, I would argue, untenable. At the same time, it is 
important to be clear that our options here are not limited to blind faith in the 
fact that the jury works on the one hand, and abandonment of the enterprise 
of lay participation altogether on the other: on the contrary, even if the jury 
is shown to be falling short, there may still be compelling reasons to retain it. 
But we surely need to know where, how and why it is falling short and have an 
evidence-based approach towards how to improve it. 
I make that call for transparency from the perspective of someone who, 
in England and Wales, has seen restrictions remain on the disclosure of juries’ 
deliberations,14 which have foreclosed the potential for large-scale research on 
the dynamics and content of “real jury” decision-making. Whilst some useful 
work has been done exploring certain aspects of the “real” juror experience, 
delving into the substance and dynamics of the deliberation itself has stayed 
off-limits.15 I realise that, by contrast, in New Zealand, you have had the benefit 
of greater insight into real juries as a result of the excellent work done by Yvette 
Tinsley and colleagues.16 But even here, I would suggest, there remain broader 
questions around access to information about juries and the need to develop 
a sustained, rather than sporadic and largely responsive, evidence base on the 
jury.
Thus far, I have suggested that there has been a steady decline in the 
romanticisation of the institution of the jury within our liberal legal process 
and a growing impetus to subject it to the sort of exposure and scrutiny 
imposed upon other arms of the criminal justice system. I have noted that this 
has been particularly pronounced in the context of sexual offence trials, where 
13 For further discussion see M Zander “Research Should Not Be Permitted in the Jury Room” (2013) 177 
CL & J 215.
14 Juries Act 1974, s 20D (as amended by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s 74).
15 Although the Law Commission of England and Wales recommended that, subject to appropriate 
safeguards, the restriction on disclosure of juries’ deliberations, then contained within s 8 of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981, “should be reformed to provide an exception allowing approved academic 
research into jury deliberations”: Law Commission of England and Wales Contempt of Court (1): Juror 
Misconduct and Internet Publications (LC340, 2013) at [4.49].
16 See New Zealand Law Commission Juries in Criminal Trials (NZLC R69, 2001). 
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in many jurisdictions there has been a profound dissatisfaction with the lack 
of progress achieved through doctrinal and evidential reforms, and a concern 
that such reforms are being undermined by endorsement in the jury room of 
problematic socio-sexual norms and what are often referred to as “rape myths”. 
Jurors in sexual offences trials often have a particularly expansive remit of 
discretion afforded to them by prevailing legal tests, and matters of credibility 
are key to their assessments of contradictory evidential accounts regarding the 
events in question. In this context, there is a concern that misconceptions about 
rape, and about “normal” socio-sexual behaviour generally, may be applied 
with impunity by jurors, in pursuance of judicial instructions to apply their 
“common sense” and “knowledge of human behaviour” to crucial questions 
about the existence of, belief in, and responsibility for, consent.
With this concern in mind, I want to turn now to give an account of 
the findings of key studies that I have undertaken in this area. As we will see, 
while those findings often reinforce the legitimacy of the concerns raised by 
critics of the jury, they also illustrate the complicated nature of both juror and 
jury deliberation, and the potential — despite, or perhaps because of, those 
complications — to do more to ensure that jurors are properly equipped for 
their task. 
III TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS: JURIES AND SEXUAL 
OFFENCE ALLEGATIONS 
I conducted my first rape jury study about 15 years ago, around the time the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 came into force in England and Wales. This Act 
introduced for the first time in the United Kingdom a statutory definition of 
consent — a person consents when she agrees by choice and has the freedom 
and capacity to make that choice. It also set out a list of circumstances in 
which consent will be presumed (either rebuttably or conclusively) to have 
been absent, for example where the complainant was asleep or had been given 
a stupefying substance, or where violence, the threat of violence or deception 
had been used. Importantly, the Act also shifted English law from a standard of 
honest belief in consent to one which required the belief held by the defendant 
to be reasonable, “having regard to all the circumstances” including any steps 
taken to ascertain consent.17 The Act was less radical than the initial reform 
17 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 1(2). 
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proposals in the Home Office’s Setting the Boundaries’ Review,18 out of which 
it developed, but still it was applauded as a substantial step forward. Amongst 
other things, it was hoped it would provide greater clarity to jurors and move 
them towards a communicative model of sexual consent.19 
Since completing that first study, I have conducted three further studies 
on this broad topic with different groups of colleagues, all of which have relied 
on a similar methodology. In all studies, a scripted trial reconstruction was 
created in consultation with legal practitioners. In the first three studies, the 
trial reconstruction was re-enacted live and in real time before an audience 
of mock jurors, comprised of volunteer members of the public. In the most 
recent study, participants watched a recorded version of the trial reconstruction 
filmed in a real courtroom. In the first three studies, the roles of counsel 
were played by qualified barristers; in the fourth study, while the role of the 
judge was played by a real judge, counsel were played by actors who received 
both advance and on-set advice from qualified advocates in respect of tone 
and delivery. In each study, the trial reconstruction lasted approximately 75 
minutes. Having watched the trial, participants were streamed into separate 
juries and given up to 90 minutes to reach a verdict. Deliberations were audio 
and video recorded and combined with participants’ responses to short pre- 
and post-deliberation questionnaires. Across these studies, over 1,500 members 
of the public have taken part, yielding data from 132 different jury groups. 
There are, of course, limitations to such mock jury research, not least 
the fact that participants know the trial is not “real” and as such will not 
have actual consequences for the parties. On that point, though, it is worth 
noting that the level of suspension of disbelief apparent across these studies 
was remarkable, with some jurors discussing at the end how stressful they 
had found the process and expressing concern about the effect of the decision 
on the parties. Moreover, while the trial script and periods of deliberation 
were inevitably curtailed to be feasible within the experimental context, these 
simulations nonetheless substantially improved — in terms of their realism 
18 Home Office Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the law on sex offences (July 2000). 
19 For further discussion, see, for example Nicola Lacey “Beset by Boundaries: the Home Office Review 
of Sex Offences” (2001) Crim LR 3; Jennifer Temkin and Andrew Ashworth “The Sexual Offences Act 
2003: (1) Rape, Sexual Assaults and the Problems of Consent” (2004) Crim LR 328; and Sharon Cowan 
“Freedom and Capacity to Make a Choice: A Feminist Analysis of Consent in the Criminal Law of 
Rape” in Vanessa E Munro and Carl F Stychin (eds) Sexuality and the Law: Feminist Engagements 
(Routledge, London, 2007) 51.
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— on the much more limited written vignette stimuli that was often used 
in prior research. In addition, these studies were relatively unusual in relying 
on a non-student volunteer sample, having a substantial group deliberation 
component and providing detailed and accurate legal tests to jurors to frame 
that discussion. Importantly, moreover, what this simulation method allowed 
for — in a way that real trials never can, of course — was isolation of certain 
variables whilst holding others constant in order to test for specific effects.20 
Thus, whilst all four studies explored jurors’ approaches to, and 
interpretation of, key provisions on consent, freedom, capacity, and reasonable 
belief,21 each also had its own distinctive focus. More specifically, the first looked 
at the way in which jurors approached rape cases in which the complainant was 
intoxicated or under the influence of drugs at the time of the attack, whether 
self or surreptitiously administered.22 The second explored jurors’ subscription 
to popular misconceptions regarding “normal” or “expected” victim behaviour 
— namely, her propensity to physically struggle during an attack, to report it 
immediately afterwards, and to appear emotionally distressed whilst recounting 
her experience to others.23 And having identified the prevalence of such views 
amongst mock jurors, the second phase of this second study also tested for an 
impact as a result of providing to jurors “myth-busting” information, either 
through expert testimony during the trial or extended judicial instructions.24 
The third study examined the impact of the adult rape complainant’s mode 
of testimony — in particular, the effect on jurors’ assessments of credibility 
20 For a more detailed discussion of the methodological strengths and weaknesses of mock jury research, 
grounded in the context of one of these substantive studies, see Emily Finch and Vanessa E Munro 
“Lifting the Veil: The Use of Focus Groups and Trial Simulations in Legal Research” (2008) 35 J Law 
& Soc 30.
21 For discussion on this, see in particular Emily Finch and Vanessa E Munro “Breaking Boundaries? 
Sexual Consent in the Jury Room” (2006) 26(3) LS 303; and Louise Ellison and Vanessa E Munro 
“Getting to (Not) Guilty: Examining Jurors’ Deliberative Processes in, and Beyond, the Context of a 
Mock Rape Trial” (2010) 30 LS 74.
22 Emily Finch and Vanessa E Munro “The Demon Drink and the Demonized Woman: Socio-Sexual 
Stereotypes and Responsibility Attribution in Rape Trials Involving Intoxicants” (2007) 16 Soc & 
Legal Stud 591.
23 Louise Ellison and Vanessa E Munro “Reacting to Rape: Exploring Mock Jurors’ Assessments of 
Complainant Credibility” (2009) 49 Brit J Criminol 202; and Louise Ellison and Vanessa E Munro 
“’Of ‘Normal Sex’ and ‘Real Rape’: Exploring the Use of Socio-Sexual Scripts in (Mock) Jury 
Deliberation” 18 Soc & Legal Stud 291.
24 Louise Ellison and Vanessa E Munro “Turning Mirrors into Windows? Assessing the Impact of (Mock) 
Juror Education in Rape Trials” 49 Brit J Criminol 363.
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where she used a screen, live-link or pre-recorded police statement to give 
her testimony.25 And in the fourth and most recent study, the key findings of 
which will be outlined in a report published by the Scottish Government in 
October 2019, my colleagues and I have been looking at both rape and physical 
assault scenarios; exploring in particular the impact that jury size, number of 
verdicts and anonymity rules have on deliberations, against the background 
of Scotland’s unique system of having 15 jurors choose by a simple majority 
between guilty, not guilty and not proven verdicts.26
In this lecture, I obviously do not have the time to go into detail on what 
we found in relation to each of these variables. What I do want to do, though, 
is “zoom out” to reflect more broadly on key findings that span across these 
studies as a collective, and to think about what they can contribute to ongoing 
debates about reform, or even abandonment, of the jury in rape cases. 
That “zooming out” comes with the disclaimer, of course, that it is not 
possible to draw strict parallels and comparisons across these studies: amongst 
other things, the scripts that were used varied slightly over time, and while 
the actors were held constant within each study, we obviously recruited a 
new group for the next incarnation. In addition, in the Scottish study, jury 
groups were directed under slightly different substantive definitions of the rape 
offence, were not necessarily required to even try to reach a unanimous verdict 
during their deliberations, and — in line with procedural rules — were only 
able to return a conviction where they were satisfied that the offence elements 
had been established on the basis of corroborated evidence.
Nonetheless, across these studies, there are still some striking consistencies 
and resonances that merit reflection. In their different ways, each highlights, I 
think, the falsity of assuming that a change in substantive legal tests — whether 
to include a definition of consent, highlight the importance of freedom and 
capacity to choose, or impose a different standard of responsibility upon 
the defendant — will automatically result in a change in interpretation and 
application on the ground. It was relatively rare across all these studies for 
25 Louise Ellison and Vanessa E Munro “A ‘Special’ Delivery? Exploring the Impact of Screens, Live-
Links and Video-Recorded Evidence on Mock Juror Deliberation in Rape Trials” (2014) 23 Soc & 
Legal Stud 3. See also Louise Ellison and Vanessa E Munro “‘Telling Tales’: Exploring Narratives of 
Life and Law within the (Mock) Jury Room” (2015) 35 LS 201 at 212.
26 This research is now published: Rachel Ormston and others Scottish Jury Research: Findings from a 
Large-Scale Mock Jury Study (Scottish Government, October 2019), available at <www.gov.scot>.
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jurors to directly employ the language of the legal tests, despite their repeated 
use by counsel and the judge; and it was even more rare for them to embark 
on an extended discussion about what those terms might mean exactly in the 
case at hand. Instead, for the most part, the tests were quickly translated into 
far more prosaic interpretations — for example, in one jury in the third study, 
it was maintained by a juror that at its core, “the point we need to decide 
is whether her removing her knickers or him removing her knickers proves 
consent”.27 Of course, concepts of freedom and capacity invite complicated 
philosophical questions, and so it is perhaps not terribly surprising that they do 
not offer as much useful guidance to jurors as hoped.28 In respect of capacity, for 
example, it was clear in the first study that jurors adopted a range of divergent 
tests, which centred variously on the complainant’s level of self-control, her 
ability to express her sober preferences, her ability to communicate, or level 
of consciousness during the assault. Whichever approach jurors took had a 
marked effect on the prospects of a conviction.29
In addition, what a belief that was reasonable “having regard to all the 
circumstances” entailed exactly was unclear to jurors, who typically levelled this 
test down to focus simply on what the defendant honestly believed. In the third 
study, for example, one juror remarked that she did not properly understand 
the test, prompting peers to paraphrase with inaccurate but rarely challenged 
alternatives, including “did [the defendant] understand that no meant no or did 
he actually think that she was coming on to him” and “it is saying that we need 
to look at it from his point of view, and did he think he was in with a chance”.30 
This, of course, undermined the shift in mens rea brought about under the 2003 
Act, reinforcing the prior position in which the only “objective buffer” was 
what jurors considered it credible the accused himself believed. 
In this context, while many jurors emphasised that it was not an 
understanding they personally endorsed, they continued to accept that a 
women’s silence or passivity could “reasonably” be taken as consent by the 
27 Ellison and Munro “‘Telling Tales’”, above n 25, at 212. 
28 Temkin and Ashworth, above n 19, at 336; and Vanessa E Munro “Shifting Sands? Consent, Context 
and Vulnerability in Contemporary Sexual Offences Policy in England and Wales” (2017) 26 Soc & 
Legal Stud 417.
29 Finch and Munro “The Demon Drink and the Demonised Woman”, above n 22; and Emily Finch 
and Vanessa E Munro “The Sexual Offences Act 2003: Intoxicated Consent and Drug Assisted Rape 
Revisited” (2004) Crim LR 789. 
30 Ellison and Munro “‘Telling Tales’”, above n 25, at 212.
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accused. As one put it, for example:31
If I were to put him in my shoes, I would have said it was not reasonable, 
but the evidence, and the way he thought, I know he didn’t actually hear a 
yes, but he didn’t hear a no, it’s just too much to be able to say guilty. 
Jurors often accompanied this with the insistence that an expected response 
to unwanted sexual contact would be to struggle physically (thereby sending 
a clear and unequivocal signal of rejection to the accused); and they imposed 
demanding expectations on a complainant to resist an attacker, and indeed 
inflict defensive injury upon him. Jurors in the second study, for example, 
asserted that “a woman can be strong when she is being pinned down”, that 
“the smallest and quietest of people, when you’re in a situation you don’t want 
to be in, you find something within you to give him a damn good kicking” and 
that “no matter how big the guy, even if she’s 8 stone and he’s 16, at some point 
she can scratch, she can hit, she can knee”.32 
While some jurors were willing, in principle, to accept that a woman might 
freeze during an attack, for many the credibility of this only really held in cases 
where the perpetrator was unknown to the victim. As one juror put it, if it was 
“someone she didn’t know that would be [different], you can believe someone 
could be paralysed by fear because you don’t know what they’re capable of”.33 
Such contributions map onto a broader point, which is that, while there is a 
tendency in some literature in this area to talk in short-hand about a “real rape” 
stereotype, which weds jurors to a narrow conception of rape as involving 
only an attack by a stranger, the vast majority of our participants were in fact 
well aware that most rapes are committed by acquaintances.34 Nonetheless, 
it was clear that jurors brought to the deliberation certain expectations — 
including around resistance and freezing — about how a woman would react 
to an assault by an acquaintance, which were different in kind from those 
pertaining to a stranger. 
31 Finch and Munro “Breaking Boundaries?”, above n 21, at 317. 
32 Ellison and Munro “Reacting to Rape”, above n 23, at 207. 
33 At 207. 
34 See further, Louise Ellison and Vanessa E Munro “A Stranger in the Bushes or an Elephant in the 
Room? Critical Reflections Upon Received Rape Myth Wisdom in the Context of a Mock Jury Study” 
(2010) 13 New Criminal Law Review 781; and Louise Ellison and Vanessa E Munro “Better the Devil 
You Know? ‘Real Rape’ Stereotypes and The Relevance of a Previous Relationship in (Mock) Juror 
Deliberations” (2013) 17 E&P 299.
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In a context in which critics had rightly criticised the previous law for 
encouraging a focus on the behaviour of the complainant rather than the 
defendant, it had been hoped that the legislative shift marked by the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 would have provided a counter-balance. But across the 
studies there was little sign of this within the jury room. Indeed, the behaviour 
of the complainant before, during and after the attack continued to be a 
primary focus of discussion. Amongst the behaviours that jurors highlighted 
as indirectly communicating her willingness to engage in intercourse were: 
offering/accepting a lift, inviting the accused into her home, remaining in the 
accused’s company for a prolonged period, paying/receiving compliments, 
drinking alcohol, sharing a goodnight kiss, and using sexual innuendo.35 Talk 
of “leading the accused on” and “sending mixed signals” were often linked to 
such behaviours, along with attributions of responsibility for the fact that she 
was “foolish” or worse for having done so. 
And while some jurors did try to distinguish the complainant’s previous 
conduct from the sexual signals that it may or may not have transmitted and 
the actuality of her sexual consent, many struggled to maintain this separation. 
This was reflected, for example, in the comment by one female juror in the 
third study that: “I don’t think she gave consent, but I think there was some 
consent there.”36 Similarly, in response to a peer’s assertion that there is nothing 
“wrong” with inviting a colleague back to your home, another female juror 
responded: “no, there isn’t anything wrong with it, but what is behind the 
thought of inviting somebody back to your house in the evening — a male 
person?”37 Thus, despite accepting, in principle, that any signalling behaviour 
cannot supplant the need for consent, many jurors were reluctant to abandon 
this logic altogether, at least in assessing any belief in consent held by the 
defendant.
In intoxication scenarios, in particular, complainants who “got 
themselves” into a drunken state were often seen as partially, if not completely, 
responsible for any subsequent sexual interaction, and even those to whom 
intoxicants were administered surreptitiously were often still criticised for 
not taking adequate care of their host substance. Meanwhile, defendants who 
35 Ellison and Munro “Of ‘Normal Sex’ and ‘Real Rape’”, above n 23, at 295
36 At 296. 
37 At 296. 
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pressured a complainant to drink, or even gave her additional alcohol without 
her knowledge, were often approached sympathetically for invoking a well-
trodden, if not exactly commendable, strategy of using alcohol to “loosen up 
inhibitions”.38 As one juror put it, for example:39 
… you might think yeah, that is very unreasonable but, from his point 
of view, you might think it’s not as unreasonable and the fact that she is 
at a party, she does look and appear to be drunk, she hasn’t told him no, 
and from the other person’s point of view it might look like he’s not being 
unreasonable.
Across all the studies, then, male sexual initiative was often seen as 
inevitable and as offering its own justification. An onus was placed on women 
both to appreciate that men would be monitoring their behaviour for evidence 
of sexual “signals” and to police their own responses accordingly, forcefully and 
unequivocally where needed. Indeed, the notion that the defendant might have 
been “so passionate and into it” or “so transfixed” that he would not be able to 
“register what she was actually doing” was often put forward.40 Amongst the 
most striking expressions of this came from one juror who asserted: “a woman 
can stop right up to the last second … a man cannot, he’s just got to keep 
going, he’s like a train, he’s just got to keep going”.41 
And these expectations from jurors about how a “credible” victim — that 
is, one deserving of sympathy and without a taint of contributory responsibility 
— would act extended not only to the period before and during the attack 
but also to its aftermath. In the second study in which a complainant waited 
three days before reporting to the police, for example, this delay presented a 
significant stumbling block to credibility for many jurors, who were adamant 
that their instinctive reaction would have been to report immediately.42 And 
even in the third study where the delay before reporting was only around 
thirty minutes, it continued to be a source of consternation. Some jurors 
38 Finch and Munro “The Demon Drink and the Demonised Woman”, above n 22, at 604. For wider 
discussion of issues around intoxication and consent, see also Finch and Munro “The Sexual Offences 
Act 2003”, above n 29; and Emily Finch and Vanessa E Munro “Intoxicated Consent and the 
Boundaries of Drug Assisted Rape” (2003) Crim L R 773. 
39 Finch and Munro “Breaking Boundaries?”, above n 21, at 318. 
40 Ellison and Munro “‘Of ‘Normal Sex’ and ‘Real Rape’”, above n 23, at 297. 
41 At 298. 
42 Ellison and Munro “Reacting to Rape”, above n 23, at 209. 
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felt it was “strange” that she had delayed making the call, and “odd” that she 
had opted to change her clothes in that intervening period but not go for a 
shower.43
IV MOVING FORWARD: FUTURE REFORM OR REMOVAL 
OF THE JURY?
So, on the whole, it is fair to say that these studies do not give cause for 
much complacency, let alone confidence, regarding the ways in which jurors 
approach their deliberative task. As Conley and Conley have observed, jurors 
— particularly in rape trials — “hear fragmentary and often conflicting 
accounts of highly contested events”44 and it is hardly surprising then that they 
fill gaps, construct stories and make sense of their conclusions through the use 
of “unofficial” rules and heuristic devices informed by personal, and what is 
perceived as common, experience. 
But this is not an issue that is unique to the rape trial. Many of the unofficial 
rules, conventions and experiences reflected in participants’ contributions 
across the four studies tap into wider narratives about the normative dynamics 
of heterosexual relationships and the capricious nature of women’s agency, 
whilst endorsing stereotypical conventions of men as active and women as 
paradoxically passive but also capable enforcers of personal boundaries. These 
narratives may also play a crucial role in other contexts in which jurors are 
tasked with dispensing justice in response to allegations of gender-based 
harms. Thus, while to date, the focus of jury research has overwhelmingly 
been on rape offences, and not without good reason — it is important that the 
findings that emerge in that context are not thought to exist in a ghetto.
To give but one contemporary example, in England and Wales and more 
recently in Scotland, dedicated “coercive control” offences have recently been 
created. These are intended to respond, through the criminal law, to situations 
in which, within domestic relationships, an accused relies on non-physical 
forms of abuse in order to humiliate or intimidate another person, or to make 
them subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, 
exploiting their resources for personal gain, depriving them of the means 
needed for independence, resistance and escape, or regulating the minutiae 
43 Ellison and Munro “‘Telling Tales’”, above n 25, at 219. 
44 Robin H Conley and John M Conley “Stories from the Jury Room: How Jurors Use Narrative to 
Process Evidence” (2009) 49 SLPS 25 at 31.
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of their everyday behaviour.45 Prosecutions under these offences are still in 
their infancy. It is not hard to imagine, however, that jurors might struggle 
to determine appropriately the point at which certain forms of conduct — 
which might be read by some as chivalrous and protective, albeit clearly 
over-zealous — cross over into a form of psychological or emotional abuse 
that merits criminalisation. It is quite feasible that unofficial rules grounded 
in the same sort of hetero-normative conventions regarding relationship 
and communication norms, and expectations of resistance and reporting by 
victims, will be relied upon here as have been in rape cases. It is important, 
therefore, to continue to see sexual and family violence, and indeed all violence 
against women, as related in this way, and to reflect on the challenges posed by, 
and to, the jury in this patriarchal frame. 
All of that said, I do not think it is entirely doom and gloom. As I 
noted at the outset, there have recently been calls to remove the jury from 
sexual offence cases or at the very least to screen and bar certain individuals 
from participation on the basis of attitudinal responses. For me, both these 
proposals are still premature. It is not often that I find myself agreeing 
with Lord Devlin, but it is right I think that the importance of having lay 
participation — in the form of the jury — at the heart of our justice system 
should not be dismissed lightly; and certainly not until it is clear — based 
on rigorous and transparent research — that its flaws are too substantial to 
be overcome. There is still, in my view, a good deal more that we could do to 
ensure that we have given the jury a fair opportunity to dispense justice in rape 
cases. Amongst other things, that includes preparing jurors and forepersons 
more appropriately for the practical and emotional challenges of their role; 
and equipping prosecutors with the resources to build cases in which they 
can proactively challenge defence strategies grounded in dubious assumptions 
about normal victim behaviour and be confident in supporting complainants 
to contextualise their own responses so that they are intelligible to jurors. It 
also involves encouraging judges to embrace it as part of their role to manage 
the tone of a trial and intervene actively when necessary to ensure questioning 
strategies are appropriate, that jurors do not hear irrelevant information that 
it will be realistically impossible for them to unremember from the narratives 
they construct of the case before them, and that the directions that they receive 




There is no question that, across these studies, there have been several 
occasions when I have felt frustrated and shocked by how participants have 
approached their deliberative task and been deeply concerned regarding the 
assumptions about socio-sexual behaviour that some of them have relied 
upon. At the same time, however, I have also consistently observed that, even 
in simulations, jurors are — for the most part — genuinely trying to do their 
best when tasked with an incredibly difficult challenge. And importantly, 
there is some evidence which suggests that, to the extent that jurors rely 
on unfounded stereotypes and myths about sexual violence, these may be 
amenable to at least some level of change. For example, in our second study, 
in which we explored the impact of giving jurors education regarding the 
frequency with which, and reasons why, complainants fail to physically resist, 
delay reporting, or display a calm demeanour at trial, we saw a substantial 
shift in attitudes and tone in respect of the delay and demeanour variables. 
This was reflected in a reduction of approximately one half in the number 
of jurors who said — after being provided with education on these points 
— that it would have made a difference to them if the complainant had 
reported sooner or been more visibly upset.46 
It is true, unfortunately, that we saw no such impact in relation to 
resistance and injury — some 90 per cent of jurors said it would have made 
a difference if the complainant had more physical injury, and this remained 
largely constant regardless of whether they received education.47 But it is also 
worth noting that we did not in that study specifically explain that freezing 
reactions are common not only in stranger but in acquaintance scenarios; and 
given that it was this that jurors often struggled to countenance, it is possible 
that more targeted information could have had a more positive impact. Some 
support for that optimism comes, though at this stage without full analysis 
of the data to confirm it, from the most recent study in which — while the 
position is complicated by the existence in Scotland of corroboration rules and 
a not proven verdict — there seemed to be a different tone to jurors’ discussion 
of resistance, with references to, and adoption of language used in, a campaign 
46 Ellison and Munro “Turning Mirrors into Windows?”, above n 24, at 369 and 371.
47 At 373. 
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by Rape Crisis Scotland on freezing responses.48 
The pre-trial DVD that some campaigners have proposed in England 
and Wales could certainly have a role to play in this education process. But 
it cannot be the only response. For one thing, concern over its evidential 
status inevitably means that it would have to be restricted in its content to 
substantively uncontroversial claims, for example about the prevalence of 
acquaintance versus stranger rape, or information about the potential impact 
of trauma on physical responses and memory recall. Its generic nature also 
means that it would be likely to cover material of no relevance at all to jurors 
in respect of the case that comes before them (which may ultimately be 
confusing or counter-productive). But perhaps most significantly, such pre-
trial interventions also risk diverting attention and resource away from broader 
public education initiatives that disavow citizens of their misconceptions about 
rape, and about normative sexual behaviour in general, regardless of whether 
they ever enter the jury room. Though evaluation of such initiatives tends to be 
small-scale and rarely longitudinal, there is evidence that they can be effective 
in changing attitudes and so have the potential to not only improve justice 
outcomes in individual cases of abuse, but to prevent abuse in the first place.49 
To the extent that the objective is to increase informed discussion within 
the jury room, another option that has been floated — instead of educating 
incoming jurors — would be to screen out and exclude the less enlightened.50 
There is, on the face of it, an appeal of simplicity to this proposal. But that 
simplicity belies, however, the substantial in-roads that such an intervention 
would make into the role and function of the jury as a vehicle for democratic 
participation in the administration of justice, and the wider ramifications 
that this may have across the system. What is more, it may also significantly 
overstate the accuracy with which such screening could ever be achieved. 
Whilst research in social psychology has substantially improved the subtlety 
and nuance of rape myth acceptance questionnaires, the discursive and 
deliberative dynamics of the jury room are multi-faceted and the task facing 
jurors is far more complicated than a simple “yes” or “no” response. Thus, 
even if a connection could reliably be made to show that scores on rape myth 
48 For more information see Rape Crisis Scotland “I Just Froze” <www.rapecrisisscotland.org.uk>.
49 Beth Cameron and Liz Murphy Campaign Evaluation Report: ‘This is Not an Invitation to Rape Me” 
(Rape Crisis Scotland, March 2008). 
50 Willmott, above n 6. 
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acceptance scales predict how participants will approach the evidence and 
determine their verdict in a rape case, a screening process based upon this 
will fail to touch the potentially vast number of additional jurors who do not 
score highly on such scales but who nonetheless also rely on problematic or 
ill-informed views within the deliberation process. 
This is not simply because people are increasingly adept at identifying 
what is the socially desirable response to attitudinal prompts about sexual 
behaviour. The reality is that while it is one thing to renounce a problematic 
view in the abstract, it is quite another to stick to it in a context in which you 
are being asked to be sure, beyond reasonable doubt, of the guilt of a person, 
to reach that conclusion on the basis of competing narratives replete with gaps 
or inconsistencies, and to not only express that perspective to peers but to 
convince them of its merits. In one of our studies, my colleague and I asked 
participants to complete an abbreviated rape myth acceptance scale before 
deliberating and looked at how jurors’ responses did or did not correlate to 
the positions they then defended in discussions.51 Admittedly, that is only one 
study and our findings regarding this relationship were ancillary to our main 
focus. Nonetheless, in it we found the predictive value of attitudinal responses 
to be potentially limited. Indeed, while — as I have discussed — there was a 
strong expectation amongst jurors of resistance against a known assailant, only 
11 per cent of those sampled agreed with the statement that “if a woman doesn’t 
fight back you can’t really say it was rape”. Sixty per cent reported that they 
strongly disagreed.52 Meanwhile, only eight per cent agreed with the statement 
that “a rape probably didn’t happen if the woman has no bruises or marks”, 
whilst 65 per cent recorded that they strongly disagreed.53 Likewise, whilst 
comments endorsing the inevitability of male sexual initiative and excess were 
common in the juries, 58 per cent of the jurors sampled reported that they 
disagreed with the claim that “rape happens when a man’s sex drive gets out of 
control”; 50 per cent claimed to disagree with the suggestion that “men don’t 
usually intend to force sex on a woman but sometimes they get too sexually 
carried away”; and 67 per cent said they disagreed that “when a man is very 
sexually aroused, he may not even realise that the woman is resisting”.54 In this 
51 Ellison and Munro “A Stranger in the Bushes, or an Elephant in the Room?”, above n 34, at 789–794. 
52 At 790. 
53 At 790.
54 At 793. 
33
Judging Juries
light, to see screening jurors based on abstract attitudinal responses as a reliable 
solution to any difficulties regarding how juries approach their deliberations in 
rape cases would, I believe, be overly optimistic.
V CONCLUDING REMARKS
In closing, I should note that, while it has yet to be published, there have 
been early indications in England and Wales that recent work conducted at 
the instigation of the Judicial College into reliance on rape myths amongst 
real jurors will paint a rather different picture. It will suggest that concerns 
about the approach of the jury have been significantly overblown, with the 
explanation for this lying primarily in the fact that, whilst previous research 
has relied on mock jurors, there is something transformative about the process 
of observing a real trial that ensures jurors in the non-experimental context 
approach their task more diligently, with greater respect for the legal tests set 
by the judge and no substantial reliance on myths or misconceptions. Indeed, 
based on fieldwork conducted at court with approximately 500 jurors, the 
research appears to have found that “only” three per cent reported being of the 
view that rape had to result in bruises or marks, and “only” five per cent that it 
could not be rape unless a person fought back.55
It is hard at this stage, without yet having had the benefit of seeing the 
full report — and being able to properly evaluate its underlying data and 
methodology — to know what to make of this finding. I will be genuinely 
delighted if the study can convince that there is in, in fact, nothing to worry 
about: that would mean we can have significantly more confidence in the 
justice process, will no longer feel equivocal about encouraging victims of 
sexual violence to report, and will benefit from police and prosecutors being 
less risk averse perhaps in the complaints (and complainants) that they are 
willing to put before the jury. But to the extent that this research seems to 
rely primarily on post-deliberation interviews with jurors, in which they are 
asked in the abstract about their subscription to rape myths, it runs into many 
of the same potential difficulties and shortcomings that were raised above in 
55 These figures and the use of the descriptor “only” are taken from Sir Brian Leveson’s Valedictory 
Lecture: Sir Brian Leveson, President of the Queen’s Bench Division “Criminal Trials: The Human 
Experience” (University College London, London, 13 June 2019) at 13. He cites these findings, 
emerging from research by Cheryl Thomas, further discussion of which is featured on BBC Radio 4’s 
Law In Action: Interview with Professor Cheryl Thomas, Professor in the Faculty of Laws at University 
College London (Joshua Rozenberg, BBC Radio 4, 27 June 2019) audio record provided by BBC.
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respect of other studies that rely too heavily on abstract attitudinal statements 
as proxies for what went on in the deliberation. Furthermore, in a context in 
which participants are asked about subscription to such myths and whether 
they informed their deliberations immediately after having returned their 
verdict in a case, there is perhaps reason to expect that they might be inclined 
to emphasise their compliance with legal tests and deny — consciously or 
otherwise — other heuristic devices. 
Thus, while I await its publication with interest, I am not convinced that 
this research will, or indeed should, quell the concerns that have amassed 
about jury deliberation in rape cases over many decades — not only across 
the United Kingdom, but internationally. Rather than closing down debate 
in this area, if anything, what it may do most compellingly is strengthen the 
case for relaxation of current legislative restrictions, so that researchers can 
embark more easily on responsible investigations that — through a diversity 
of rigorous methods — engage with the mechanics and complexity of the real 
deliberation process and shed light on the jury room. Doing so has its risks, 
of course, but it may be the only thing that can rekindle liberal law’s love of 
the jury.
